



ERIN E. GOULD∗ 
Read the Fine Print: A Critical Look at 
Oregon’s Noncompete and 
Nonsolicitation Agreement Laws 
n August 6, 2007, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski signed into 
law substantial revisions to Oregon’s statute governing 
noncompete agreements between employers and employees, 
significantly limiting the enforceability of these agreements.1  The 
statutory revisions were drafted through Oregon Senate Bill 248 
during the 2007 Oregon legislative session2 by the Oregon Bureau of 
Labor and Industries (BOLI).3  Dan Gardner, the Oregon Labor 
Commissioner in 2007, brought this bill to the legislature to protect 
Oregon workers from the unfair and inappropriate use of noncompete 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2010; M.A., Public Policy, The 
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 2004.  Notes and Comments Editor, 
Oregon Law Review, 2009–10.  Thanks to Professor Judd Sneirson for advice and 
guidance. 
1 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2009); Or. State Legislature, 2007 Senate Measure 
History: Senate Bill 248, http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/pubs/senmh.html (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2009). 
2 S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), available at http://www.leg 
.state.or.us/07reg/measures/sb0200.dir/sb0248.intro.html. 
3 BOLI filed Senate Bill 248 prior to the start of the legislative session.  State agencies 
often draft and submit legislation to be considered during the regular legislative session 
prior to the start of that session if the agency has been researching and working on the bill 
during the interim.  This is referred to as a “pre-session” filing of a bill. 
O 
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agreements by employers.4  This bill was a priority for BOLI and the 
Commissioner because the Agency received reports and complaints 
that employers were enforcing noncompete agreements against low-
wage workers and employees that were laid off in company 
downsizing.5  With this impetus, BOLI then conducted research and 
found a study reporting both that Oregon had the fifth highest 
enforceability rate of noncompete agreements in the country and that 
noncompete agreement disputes in Oregon were on the rise.6  After 
much committee testimony, and after several amendments, the bill 
passed both chambers of the legislature and became law.7 
The purpose of enacting Senate Bill 248 was to protect Oregon 
workers from a “‘dangerous expansion in the use of non-competition 
agreements in Oregon and . . . being unfairly prevented from working 
in their chosen fields of expertise.’”8  But passage of this bill was not 
a straightforward victory for Oregon employees.  After hard lobbying 
from the Professional Insurance Agents of Oregon/Idaho, the 
legislation was amended to exclude nonsolicitation agreements from 
the statutory restrictions.9  This exclusion may undercut much of the 
bill’s intended purpose. 
During the course of the legislative process, proponents of a bill 
often have to make compromises in order to both ensure that the 
legislation will face as little opposition as possible and ensure its 
passage into law.  Such compromises can come in many forms, 
including a minor word change in the statute, a sunset clause,10 or a 
statutory exemption.  Often, a compromise will have little effect on 
 
4 Hearing on S. 248 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess., 
Exhibit L, at 1–3 (Or. 2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (written testimony of Dan Gardner, 
Comm’r, Bureau of Labor and Industries).  All legislative materials cited in this Comment 
are located in the Oregon State Archives, Salem, Oregon. 
5 See id. at 1. 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Or. State Legislature, supra note 1. 
8 Press Release, Bureau of Labor & Indus., Majority of Oregon Workers Now Protected 
from Noncompete Agreements Thanks to Passage of Labor Commissioner’s SB 248 (June 
28, 2007) (quoting Oregon Labor Commissioner Dan Gardner), available at 
www.oregon.gov/BOLI/SB248_Noncompetes_final.pdf. 
9 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(4) (2009); see also Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit I, at 1 
(written testimony of Lana Butterfield, Oregon Lobbyist, Professional Insurance Agents of 
Oregon/Idaho); id. at Exhibit L, at 2–3 (written testimony of Dan Gardner, Comm’r, 
Bureau of Labor and Industries); Letter from Randy Sutton, Attorney, Prof’l Ins. Agents of 
Oregon/Idaho, to Oregon House Judiciary Committee (May 24, 2007) (on file with 
author). 
10 A sunset clause inserts a time limit into the terms of the statute. 
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the overall impact or intent of the statute.  However, on some 
occasions, a compromise made during the legislative process can 
stealthily, and sometimes unwittingly, undo the original intent of a 
bill.  Senate Bill 248 and the resulting noncompete agreement statute 
contain an example of a compromise, in the form of a statutory 
exemption, that significantly undermines the purpose of the bill. 
On its face, the recent Oregon noncompete agreement law looks 
like it accomplished much of what BOLI and the Commissioner 
intended.  Generally, the statute makes noncompete agreements more 
difficult for employers to enforce against employees.  The bill clearly 
states that employers may only enforce a noncompete agreement if an 
employee fits certain criteria, including a minimum salary and a 
specific, high-level job description.11  The statute also contains many 
other very specific provisions addressing when a noncompete 
agreement may be voidable, including a requirement that such an 
agreement be signed at least two weeks prior to the start of 
employment and only be enforceable for two years after 
employment.12  As written, Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 653.295 is 
one of the most narrowly defined noncompete agreement statutes in 
the country.13 
However, like many narrowly defined statutes, it contains a self-
defeating loophole.  The statute exempts nonsolicitation agreements 
from all statutory regulations governing noncompete agreements.14  
Prior to the enactment of the statutory changes to ORS 653.295, both 
noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements were subject 
to the same restrictions under Oregon statutory law and Oregon 
common law.15  Now it appears that the statute applies only to 
noncompete agreements and does not apply at all to nonsolicitation 
 
11 § 653.295(1)(b) (referring to employees excluded from protection against 
noncompetition agreements as defined by OR. REV. STAT. § 653.020(3) (2009)). 
12 § 653.295(1)(a), (6). 
13 Most statutes governing restrictive covenants do not have as many specific terms as 
the Oregon statute.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.  6, § 2707 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(4) 
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599 
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.772 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217–219 (Supp. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 
2002); WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2002). 
14 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(4) (2009). 
15 See First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238–39 (D. 
Or. 2002); Dymock v. Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Or. Indus., Inc., 334 Or. 55, 
58–59, 45 P.3d 114, 115 (2002). 
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agreements, leaving nonsolicitation agreements free from any 
statutory restrictions.  This is an odd policy decision because 
noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements are such 
similar instruments and, in many instances, both are integrated into 
the same restrictive covenant.  It is perplexing that a legislature would 
tightly regulate one and completely free the other. 
Because these restrictions governing noncompete agreements and 
the distinction between noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements 
have both been in effect for only a short period of time, the legal 
fallout, including interpretation by the courts, is uncertain.  Many 
business law firms in Oregon have posted notices on their websites 
alerting clients to the statutory changes and advising them to adjust all 
future noncompete agreements to fit the recent law.16  These firms 
warn employers that noncompete agreements are enforceable in very 
limited circumstances.  Very few of these websites mention the 
nonsolicitation exclusion.  The Oregon State Bar published a brief 
article summarizing the legislation.17  The article focuses on the 
potential impact of the strict noncompete agreement regulations and 
suggests that the harsh regulatory provisions may deter businesses 
from operating in Oregon.18  The authors mention the nonsolicitation 
exclusion but say little about its potential implications.19 
The recent Oregon noncompete agreement statute presents an 
interesting potential conflict.  On the one hand, the law considerably 
restricts employers’ use of noncompete agreements; on the other 
hand, it rolls back all restrictions on nonsolicitation agreements, 
which were formerly subject to the same restrictions as noncompete 
agreements.  The nonsolicitation exemption may, in fact, give 
employers more room to restrict competition through nonsolicitation 
agreements than they had previously.  Those who are most vulnerable 
to this new exemption for nonsolicitation agreements are small 
business entrepreneurs—the hair stylist who, after working for a 
corporate salon, wants to open a shop of her own or the bike salesman 
 
16 See Miller Nash LLP, New Law Affects Arbitration and Noncompetition Agreements 
in Oregon (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.millernash.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=1981; 
Stoel Rives LLP, Employment Law Alert: Oregon Legislature Limits the Use of 
Noncompetition Agreements (July 3, 2007), http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show 
=2485. 
17 Leonard D. DuBoff & Christy O. King, A New Wrinkle: Noncompetition Agreements 
in Oregon, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug./Sept. 2007, at 36, available at http://www.osbar.org/ 
publications/bulletin/07augsep/practice.html. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. at 37. 
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who, after working for low wages at a local shop, wants to start a 
business of his own.  These are just a couple examples of small 
business hopefuls who could be restricted in their ability to solicit 
customers by an employer’s unregulated nonsolicitation agreement. 
This Comment analyzes the recently enacted noncompete 
agreement statute and its potential implications and problems.  In this 
effort, Parts I and II both explore how Oregon’s statute compares to 
other state statutes in restricting noncompete and nonsolicitation 
agreements and show how courts have interpreted statutes in Oregon 
and in some other states that govern both types of agreements.  Part 
III attempts to uncover how the Oregon legislature went about 
creating this perplexing statute by looking at the legislative history 
leading up to the passage of Senate Bill 248.  Next, Part IV explores 
some potential effects the statute may have on employees and 
employers and implications it may have in the courts.  Finally, Part V 
suggests alternative statutory language that the legislature ought to 
consider to avoid some of the potential problems described in this 
Comment. 
I 
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS V. NONSOLICITATION AGREEMENTS: 
STATUTORY DISTINCTIONS 
Noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements are both 
restrictive covenants limiting a former employee’s future employment 
activities. Noncompete agreements—also referred to as 
noncompetition agreements or covenants not to compete—prohibit an 
employee from working for a competitor or starting up a competitive 
business upon termination, whereas nonsolicitation agreements—also 
referred to as nonpiracy agreements—prohibit an employee from 
soliciting business from the employer’s customer list, soliciting 
employment from the employer’s current employees, or both.20  They 
are usually intertwined in one employment contract because 
nonsolicitation provisions are often used as a subset of a noncompete 
agreement.21  For example, there is an element of nonsolicitation 
within the following definition of a noncompete agreement in the 
Oregon Revised Statutes: 
 
20 Elizabeth E. Nicholas, Note, Drafting Enforceable Non-Solicitation Agreements in 
Kentucky, 95 KY. L.J. 505, 508 (2007). 
21 See id. 
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[A]n agreement, written or oral, express or implied, between an 
employer and employee under which the employee agrees that the 
employee, either alone or as an employee of another person, will 
not compete with the employer in providing products, processes or 
services that are similar to the employer’s products, processes or 
services for a period of time or within a specified geographic      
area . . . .22 
The idea that a former employee will not compete within a certain 
geographic area implies that the former employee will also not seek 
out customers or employees of the former employer. 
Because nonsolicitation is a subpart of noncompetition, a 
nonsolicitation agreement clause is typically imbedded or implicit in a 
noncompete agreement.  An employer’s interests, such as protecting 
trade secrets, customer lists, and employee loyalty, can be protected 
in the same way through either a nonsolicitation agreement or a 
noncompete agreement.23  A noncompete agreement is a broad 
restriction, placing limitations on a former employee’s ability to work 
in a particular field or for certain competitors.  On the other hand, a 
nonsolicitation agreement is more specific; it protects an employer’s 
interests by restricting the former employee’s ability to actively seek 
customers and other employees of the former employer.  Solicitation 
is a form of competition, so it follows that noncompetition 
agreements would restrict solicitation of customers and other 
employees along with other forms of competition. 
Noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements are the subject of 
many legal disputes because they impose restrictions on an employee 
after the employment relationship has been terminated.24  This 
concept, by definition, requires an employee to give up certain rights, 
such as the right to freely pursue future employment and 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  A former employee will almost always 
resist this restriction once the employment relationship has ended 
because the employee is no longer receiving the benefit of the 
employment contract.25  In other words, the employee is subject to the 
former employer’s terms even though the employee is no longer being 
paid by that employer.  The result is often that an employee will 
 
22 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(7)(d) (2009). 
23 Nicholas, supra note 20, at 507–09. 
24 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
626–27 (1960). 
25 See id.; see also Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of 
Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 111 (2008). 
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contest the legality of the agreement.  Or, because an imbalance of 
power exists between employee and employer, an employee may just 
succumb to a noncompete agreement and forgo the opportunity to 
open a business, perhaps without considering any legal rights that 
could overcome the agreement.26  Both results—enduring a legal 
contest or submitting to the employer’s superior bargaining power—
are problematic.  Litigation over the enforceability of a restrictive 
covenant is costly for both parties, and the enforcement of an illegal 
contract on an unsophisticated employee is unjust. 
A.  State Statutes Governing Noncompete and Nonsolicitation 
Agreements 
1.  National Trends 
A state statute can help guide employers, employees, and the courts 
by setting specific parameters for when a noncompete agreement or 
nonsolicitation agreement can be enforceable.  No federal law 
governs these agreements, so states are free to restrict and define this 
area of employment law in practically any manner they choose.27  
Oregon is not alone in its use of statutory regulation to articulate the 
law governing the use of noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements 
within the state.  Almost half of the states use some form of statutory 
regulation to govern noncompete agreements and other restrictive 
covenants.28  However, they range from all-out prohibitions to 
general allowance.29 
Some state statutes generally do not permit restrictive covenants.  
For example, California has long been famous for its total prohibition 
of noncompete agreements.30  The California law in this area is also 
the most to-the-point statute as it sums up its effect in the following 
sentence: “[E]very contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to 
that extent void.”31  Some states approach California’s all-out 
restriction, including Oklahoma, which prohibits contracts in restraint 
of trade except those either between a business and a seller of that 
 
26 Blake, supra note 24, at 647–48. 
27 See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 25, at 120. 
28 Nicholas, supra note 20, at 515. 
29 See generally CHRISTOPHER REINHART, STATE LAWS ON NON-COMPETITION 
CLAUSES (2007), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0112.htm. 
30 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008). 
31 Id. 
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business’s goodwill or between partners that agree none of them will 
carry out a similar business within a certain geographic area if the 
partnership dissolves.32  Similarly, Louisiana’s and North Dakota’s 
statutes are nearly identical to the statute in Oklahoma.33 
While some laws, like those mentioned above, begin with a 
presumption that restrictive covenants are void or voidable, other 
statutes begin with a presumption that they are allowed.  For example, 
Florida’s statute states that a restrictive covenant is allowed as long as 
the employer can demonstrate the existence of “one or more 
legitimate business interests,” including trade secrets, confidential 
business interests, relationships with potential clients, and marketing 
within a certain geographic area.34  Texas also has a statute that 
allows noncompete agreements as long as they are ancillary to, or part 
of, another enforceable employment agreement and do not impose a 
greater restraint than necessary on trade.35  However, the Texas 
statute does not clarify further what a “greater restraint than is 
necessary” may be.36  Statutes in Hawaii and Michigan also generally 
allow restrictive covenants as long as they are used to protect 
legitimate business interests.37 
Finally, some state laws limit the use of restrictive covenants only 
for certain professions.  Delaware has a noncompete agreement 
statute that voids such agreements when they restrict the right of a 
physician to practice medicine within a particular geographic region 
and for any period of time.38  Similarly, a Maine statute presumes all 
contracts that restrict employees in the broadcasting industry from 
obtaining employment within a certain geographic area for a specific 
time to be unreasonable.39 
Although states vary on the language they use to describe what 
types of covenants are covered by the statute, most restrictive 
covenant laws cover both noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation 
agreements.40  But very few state statutes make clear that the statute 
 
32 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217–219 (Supp. 2007). 
33 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006). 
34 FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1) (2007). 
35 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2002). 
36 Id. 
37 HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(4) (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.772 (2008). 
38 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (2005). 
39 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599(2) (2007). 
40 See statutes cited supra note 13. 
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governs all restrictive covenants.41  Florida is one state that does 
explicitly regulate all restrictive covenants between employers and 
employees, including nonsolicitation agreements.42  The term used to 
describe the subject of the Florida statute is “restrictive covenant,” 
which includes noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements.43  Also, 
the “legitimate business interests” that the Florida law lists include 
relationships with “specific prospective or existing customers, 
patients, or clients,” which are the types of interests that a 
nonsolicitation agreement is written to protect.44 
The language used to describe the subject of most state restrictive 
covenant statutes is some version of “any contract or covenant in 
restraint of trade.”  This broad language is used in California, Hawaii, 
Louisiana, and North Dakota.45  Such language implies that the 
statute is meant to apply to all restrictive covenants, including 
nonsolicitation agreements.  However, none of these statutes are as 
explicit as Florida in demonstrating that nonsolicitation agreements 
are included in the definition of “contract” or “covenant.”46 
More difficult to interpret are those statutes that only use the term 
“covenant not to compete.”  Statutes in states including Oregon, 
Texas, and Wisconsin apply to “noncompetition agreements,” but it 
may be unclear from the language whether or not that term includes 
nonsolicitation agreements.47  None of these laws, except Oregon’s 
statute after the 2007 amendments, exempts any other restrictive 
covenants, such as nonsolicitation agreements, from the restrictions 
imposed on noncompete agreements.48  As the next Part explains, the 
decision whether or not nonsolicitation agreements should be subject 
to the same restrictions as noncompete agreements is generally left to 
the courts.  Courts tend to hold that the terms “noncompetition 
 
41 See statutes cited supra note 13. 
42 FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2007). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(4) 
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006). 
46 See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2007). 
47 See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2009); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 
(Vernon 2002); WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2002). 
48 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(4) (2009). 
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agreement” and “covenant not to compete,” as used in these statutes, 
include nonsolicitation agreements.49 
2.  The Oregon Statute: A Unique Approach 
No state statute follows Oregon’s law after the 2007 amendments 
by severely restricting noncompete agreements while also completely 
freeing nonsolicitation agreements.  Prior to the 2007 amendments to 
ORS 653.295, Oregon’s restrictive covenant statute was similar to 
those in Wisconsin, Texas, Michigan, and Hawaii; it generally 
allowed restrictive covenants with some specific constraints.50  The 
most noteworthy restriction made a noncompetition agreement void 
and unenforceable unless entered into upon the initial employment of 
the employee or upon subsequent bona fide advancement.51 
The 2007 amendments significantly changed the law to make 
noncompete agreements generally unenforceable, with some 
exceptions.52  At first glance, these strict restrictions on noncompete 
agreements appear to make the statute, in effect, similar to those in 
North Dakota and Oklahoma because the statute begins with a 
presumption that noncompete agreements will be voidable unless they 
are applied in specific circumstances.53  Subsection (1) of the statute 
opens with the following statement: “A noncompetition agreement 
entered into between an employer and employee is voidable and may 
not be enforced by a court of this state unless . . . .”54  However, 
unlike the Oklahoma and North Dakota statutes, which have language 
providing one or two general examples of when noncompete 
agreements will be allowed, Oregon’s law describes which types of 
noncompete agreements will be allowed in extraordinary detail. 
Subsection (1)(a) of the Oregon statute describes the process by 
which the agreement must be entered into to be enforceable, including 
 
49 See First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238–39 (D. 
Or. 2002); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 233 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794 (W.D. Va. 
2002); Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292–93 (Cal. 2008); Dymock v. 
Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Or. Indus., Inc., 334 Or. 55, 58–59, 45 P.3d 114, 115 
(2002). 
50 See Act of Aug. 7, 2007, ch. 902, 2007 Or. Laws 248 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
36.620, 653.295 (2009)). 
51 § 653.295(1)(a). 
52 § 653.295(1). 
53 Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217–219 
(Supp. 2007). 
54 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1) (2009). 
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a provision requiring the agreement be entered into at least two weeks 
before the employee starts the job.55  Subsections 1(a)(A) and (B) 
require that 
[t]he employer informs the employee in a written employment offer 
received by the employee at least two weeks before the first day of 
the employee’s employment that a noncompetition agreement is 
required as a condition of employment; or . . . [t]he noncompetition 
agreement is entered into upon a subsequent bona fide advancement 
of the employee by the employer.56 
Subsection (2) adds another temporal provision to the statute by 
limiting the time a noncompete agreement may be in effect.57  It 
states as follows: “The term of a noncompetition agreement may not 
exceed two years from the date of the employee’s termination.”58 
Subsections (1)(b), (c), and (d) of the amended statute limit the 
enforceability of noncompete agreements to certain employees.  
Subsection (1)(b) states that the employee must be “a person 
described in ORS 653.020(3),”59 which is an employee that exercises 
independent judgment and predominantly performs managerial 
tasks.60  Subsection (1)(c) restricts the use of noncompete agreements 
to an employer with “a protectable interest.”61  “[A]n employer has a 
protectable interest when the employee: (A) [h]as access to trade 
secrets . . . (B) [h]as access to competitively sensitive confidential 
business or professional information that otherwise would not qualify 
as a trade secret, including product development plans, product 
launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans . . . .”62  Subsection 
(1)(c)(C) provides for the enforceability of noncompetition 
agreements against an employee hired as an on-air talent in the field 
of broadcasting but requires that the employer pay the former 
employee half the employee’s salary during the time the agreement is 
enforceable.63  Finally, subsection (1)(d) states that an employee must 
 
55 § 653.295(1)(a)(A). 
56 § 653.295(1)(a)(A)–(B). 
57 § 653.295(2). 
58 Id. 
59 § 653.295(1)(b). 
60 See § 653.020(3). 
61 § 653.295(1)(c). 
62 § 653.295(1)(c)(A)–(B). 
63 See § 653.295(1)(c)(C). 
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have an “annual gross salary and commissions [that] . . . exceeds the 
median family income for a four-person family.”64 
Subsections (1) and (2) of the statute are highly restrictive, like 
some other state laws.  The Oregon statute is different, however, in its 
approach to restricting the use of noncompete agreements.  No other 
state statute sets strict provisions—the way Oregon does—on the 
manner in which a noncompete agreement should be entered into or 
the type of employee with whom a noncompete agreement may be 
used.  Oregon’s statute essentially micromanages the process of 
forming and utilizing noncompete agreements, rather than generally 
protecting the interests of employees and employers. 
Further, while the noncompete agreement provisions are highly 
restrictive and specific, the Oregon statute contains an exemption for 
nonsolicitation agreements, including covenants not to solicit 
customers or employees of the former employer.65  The law removes 
all statutory restrictions on nonsolicitation agreements.  Subsection 
(4)(b) of the statute states that none of the restrictions on noncompete 
agreements apply to “covenant[s] not to solicit employees of the 
employer or solicit or transact business with customers of the 
employer.”66  This subsection creates a distinction between 
noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements, stating that 
the restrictive and narrowly defined provisions of the recently enacted 
statute do not apply to nonsolicitation agreements. 
This exemption, coupled with the restrictive provisions of 
subsections (1) and (2), makes the Oregon statute highly unusual 
compared to the statutes of other states.  While, on the one hand, 
subsections (1) and (2) drive the Oregon law of noncompete 
agreements to resemble the more restrictive statutes of North Dakota 
and Oklahoma by significantly limiting enforceability, subsection (4) 
makes the Oregon law of nonsolicitation agreements even more 
lenient than those in Texas and Florida.  This is a somewhat illogical 
approach to the law of restrictive covenants.  Most statutes are either 
generally lenient or highly restrictive of all restrictive covenants.  The 
inconsistency of the Oregon approach is troubling because it will 
likely create confusion for employers and employees as to what terms 
of a restrictive covenant are enforceable. 
 
64 § 653.295(1)(d). 
65 § 653.295(4). 
66 § 653.295(4)(b). 
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II 
BACKGROUND LAW: COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
A.  General Common Law 
Although state statutes have helped employers and employees 
determine the enforceability of restrictive covenants, the statutes often 
do not prevent these groups from contesting these contracts in court.  
Legal conflict over noncompete agreements dates back to eighteenth-
century English law.  The first important case was Mitchel v. 
Reynolds, which involved a dispute over a noncompete agreement 
restricting a baker from practicing his trade following his employment 
with a bakery.67  The Mitchel decision first articulated the underlying 
conflict presented by a noncompete agreement: restraint of trade for 
employees versus the protectable interests of employers.68  Courts 
continue to work to strike a balance between these two interests 
despite the likely presence of a state statute. 
Courts generally follow the common law for restrictive covenants 
articulated in section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: A 
noncompete agreement will be enforceable as long as (1) the restraint 
is no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate 
interest or (2) the employer’s need is not outweighed by the hardship 
to the employee and the likely injury to the public.69  This 
Restatement definition was shaped by many court decisions, including 
the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan 
(Rem Metals).70  In Rem Metals, the court held that the employer 
bears the burden of showing either that a noncompete agreement is 
necessary to protect trade secrets or other protectable interests of the 
employer or that other special circumstances exist to enforce a 
restrictive covenant.71 
Along the lines of the Rem Metals decision, courts generally have 
held that legitimate protectable interests of an employer include (1) 
trade secrets, (2) special investment in training of employees, and (3) 
preventing direct competition by a former employee within a certain 
 
67 Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (Ch.D.). 
68 Id. at 349. 
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1979). 
70 Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan, 278 Or. 715, 565 P.2d 1080 (1977). 
71 Id. at 721–22, 565 P.2d at 1083–84. 
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geographic area.72  A trade secret is an item owned by an employer 
that derives independent economic value from not being generally 
known and is subject to employer efforts to maintain its secrecy.73  
Trade secrets are commonplace in the high-tech industry.74  A court 
will also protect an employer’s investment in special training of an 
employee.  The employer bears the burden of showing that the 
training in question was beyond “general training” given to its entire 
workforce.75 
Finally, a court will often uphold a noncompete agreement that 
prevents a former employee from directly competing with the 
employer within a certain geographic area.76  Imbedded in this 
employer interest is the concept of nonsolicitation.  At the heart of 
this protectable interest is the desire of an employer to prevent a 
former employee from soliciting customers, or even other employees, 
by competing within a certain geographic area. 
Of course, a noncompete agreement will not be enforceable if the 
employer’s interests are outweighed by those of the employee and the 
general public.  Employee interests include adequate consideration for 
the restrictive covenant and the ability for the employee to make a 
living.77  Many jurisdictions require that an employee must receive 
separate consideration, beyond continuing employment, from an 
employer to create an enforceable noncompete agreement.78  Other 
jurisdictions, like Oregon prior to the statutory amendments, require a 
noncompete agreement to be signed at the time of initial 
employment.79  In other words, courts generally do not approve of 
employers springing a noncompete agreement on an employee in the 
middle of the employment relationship.  Courts also generally 
disfavor noncompete agreements that are too restrictive on a former 
 
72 See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS 
LIMITATIONS 405, 437 (2007). 
73 Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A 
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 
80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1177 (2001). 
74 Id. at 1190 (noting that the independent economic value of technical trade secrets 
includes not just the technological data, but also the application of such data by employees 
who know how to use it). 
75 GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 19–20 (2d ed. 1975). 
76 GLYNN ET AL., supra note 72, at 436–37. 
77 Id. at 435–38. 
78 Id. at 435–36. 
79 See id. 
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employee’s mobility and ability to make a living.80  Finally, courts 
disfavor noncompete agreements if they infringe too heavily on the 
interest of society in maintaining a robust marketplace of innovation 
and free and fair competition.81 
Nationally, courts are generally disfavoring contracts in restraint of 
trade and trending away from enforcing noncompete agreements.82  
Given this trend, it is not surprising that Oregon took steps to further 
restrict its noncompete agreement statute.  It is surprising, however, 
that Oregon went in a different direction with regard to 
nonsolicitation agreements. 
B.  Courts’ Interpretations of State Noncompete and Nonsolicitation 
Statutes 
1.  National Trends 
Along with trending toward general disfavor of restrictive 
covenants in employment relationships, courts are also more inclined 
to treat noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements as subject to the 
same statutory restrictions.  A common question for the courts is 
whether or not the statutory language used to describe the subject of 
these laws is meant to include all restrictive covenants or be subject to 
exceptions.  As mentioned above, state statutes vary as to what 
specific language they use when referring to restrictive covenants.  
Some states, like Florida, use inclusive terms like “restrictive 
covenant,”83 some, like California and Louisiana, use general terms 
that essentially amount to “contract in restraint of trade,”84 and others, 
like Oregon, use the term “noncompetition agreements.”85 
When a statute is explicit, courts have an easier time determining 
whether or not all restrictive covenants are covered by the statutory 
regulations.  For example, Florida’s statute is fairly explicit in that it 
covers all restrictive covenants including nonsolicitation agreements.  
Consequently, a decision of the Florida Court of Appeals reiterated 
that nonsolicitation and noncompete agreements are subject to the 
 
80 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 25, at 115. 
81 Id. at 114–15. 
82 Id. at 137–38. 
83 FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2007). 
84 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 
(Supp. 2008). 
85 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2009). 
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same statutory regulations in a case involving a nonsolicitation 
agreement between an automobile dealer and a sales manager.86 
Courts have more room for interpretation when the statutory 
language is not explicit.  Some courts have inferred exceptions to the 
restrictions when the subject of the statute is less specific.  For 
example, Louisiana’s statute states that “[e]very contract or 
agreement . . . by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful 
profession [or] trade” is null or void,87 with some exceptions for the 
sale of goodwill and the dissolution of partnerships.88  Although this 
appears to be an all-encompassing definition, Louisiana courts have 
held that employment agreements containing provisions prohibiting a 
former employee from soliciting other employees are outside the 
scope of the statute.89  It is worth noting that those holdings came 
from decisions in 1952 and 1980. 
Currently, however, courts are trending away from allowing 
exceptions to be inferred in restrictive covenant laws, no matter how 
vague the statutory language might be.  The 2002 decision in 
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., held that, under 
Virginia law, noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements were 
subject to the same restrictions.90  The court held that a three-prong 
test required for enforceability of noncompete agreements was also 
required for the enforceability of nonsolicitation agreements.91 
A recent decision before the Supreme Court of California had a 
similar holding.  The California Business and Professions Code states 
that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a 
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void.”92  Until recently, California courts have held that 
noninterference agreements93 were exceptions to this all-out 
prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade.  The precedent for this 
 
86 Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 859–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
87 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921(A) (Supp. 2008). 
88 § 23:921(B). 
89 Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Serv., 60 So. 2d 83, 85 (La. 1952); 
see also Nat’l Oil Serv. of La., Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d 1269, 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
90 MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 233 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
91 Id. at 794. 
92 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008). 
93 Noninterference agreements are similar to nonsolicitation agreements.  
Noninterference agreements focus on intentional acts to interfere with the former 
employer’s business relationships. 
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exception was grounded in a 1985 decision from the California Court 
of Appeals—and several decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit—which held that noninterference agreements were 
part of a “narrow restraint” exception because they did not directly 
restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful profession.94  Therefore, 
nonsolicitation agreements were treated as an exception to the rule.  
Recently, however, the California Supreme Court held in Edwards v. 
Arthur Andersen LLP both that the “narrow restraint” exception was 
not allowed under a strict reading of section 16600 of the California 
Business and Professions Code and that nonsolicitation agreements 
could no longer be considered outside the restrictions of the general 
restrictive covenant prohibition.95 
2.  Courts’ Interpretations of Oregon’s Statute 
Some of the best examples of the court trends described above—to 
generally not enforce restrictive covenants and to hold that 
noncompete and nonsolicitation agreements are subject to the same 
restrictions—have come from state and federal interpretations of 
Oregon’s statute.  Prior to the 2007 amendments to ORS 653.295, the 
vagueness of Oregon’s law left much to be interpreted by the state 
and federal courts in noncompete agreement disputes.  For example, 
the term “initial employment” was subject to various interpretations.  
Several cases attempted to interpret that phrase, including the 
following: Konecrances, Inc. v. Scott Sinclair, which held that a 
noncompete agreement signed sixteen days after employment was not 
valid because sixteen days was too late after initial employment;96 
Pacific Veterinary Hospital v. White, which held that amended or 
subsequent agreements could not replace the original noncompete 
agreement signed when the employee began employment;97 and 
McGee v. Coe Manufacturing Co., which held that a noncompete 
agreement is no longer valid if full-time work becomes part-time 
work.98  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the 
meaning of the term “bona fide advancement” in the Oregon statute to 
 
94 Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840–44 (Ct. App. 1985). 
95 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290–93 (Cal. 2008). 
96 Konecranes, Inc. v. Scott Sinclair, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (D. Or. 2004). 
97 Pac. Veterinary Hosp. v. White, 72 Or. App. 533, 537, 626 P.2d 570, 572 (1985). 
98 McGee v. Coe Mfg. Co., 203 Or. App. 10, 16–17, 125 P.3d 26, 28–29 (2005). 
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mean new and more responsibilities, different reporting relationships, 
and a change in title and higher pay.99 
The most significant court interpretations of the pre-2007 statute, 
however, were those regarding nonsolicitation agreements.  As stated 
above, Oregon’s statute only refers to “noncompetition agreements.”  
However, in 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a 
nonsolicitation agreement was subject to the same statutory 
restrictions as a noncompete agreement.100  In that case, an employer 
required an employee to sign a nonsolicitation agreement after the 
start of employment.101  The court held that the nonsolicitation 
agreement, like noncompete agreements, had to be entered into at 
either the start of initial employment or bona fide advancement to be 
valid.102  Similarly, the U.S. District Court of Oregon held in First 
Allmerica Financial Life Insurance Co. v. Sumner that employment 
contract provisions prohibiting employees from soliciting other 
employees after the termination of an employment relationship 
constituted noncompetition clauses under Oregon law and came under 
the purview of the statute.103 
In sum, Oregon law prior to the 2007 amendments was such that 
noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements were treated 
as the same instrument under the law.  Both agreements were subject 
to the same statutory restrictions in ORS 653.295.  Under that statute, 
both were to be entered into at the start of initial employment or upon 
a bona fide advancement.  Beyond those statutory restrictions, courts 
generally used the Restatement standard—whether the protectable 
interest of the employer outweighed the harm from restraint of trade 
on both the employee and the public—to determine whether a 
noncompete or nonsolicitation agreement should be enforceable.  
However, as explained below, the 2007 amendments instituted 
through Senate Bill 248 took Oregon in a completely different 
direction. 
 
99 Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 581–83 (9th Cir. 2004). 
100 Dymock v. Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Or. Indus., Inc., 334 Or. 55, 58–59, 
45 P.3d 114, 115–16 (2002). 
101 Id. at 57, 45 P.3d at 115–16. 
102 Id. at 60, 45 P.3d at 116. 
103 First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238–39 (D. Or. 
2002). 
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III 
OREGON’S RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 
HOW THE STATUTE CAME TO BE 
According to the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI), 
the laws governing noncompete agreements in Oregon were 
insufficiently protecting employees from unnecessary 
postemployment restrictions imposed by employers.104  BOLI had 
compiled data showing that, from 2005 to 2007, low-wage and blue-
collar workers, ranging from mechanics to call center employees to 
parking lot attendants, were threatened with lawsuits by employers for 
violating noncompete agreements.105  For example, two electricians 
in Bend, Oregon, were threatened by a lawsuit from their former 
employer when they went to work for a competitor across town.106  In 
Salem, Oregon, a manager of a copy center had signed a noncompete 
agreement and then was laid off when his company downsized.107  He 
went to work for another copy center across town, and his former 
employer threatened to sue claiming, “[y]ou are now liable for all 
present and future lost profits that [the company] sustains as a result 
of your actions.”108  He then took a job in McMinnville, Oregon, 
resulting in an eighty-mile, round-trip commute, in an effort to not 
violate the contract.109 
BOLI took notice of these complaints and found that this use of 
restrictive covenants was creating an unfair burden on and severely 
limiting employment options for many employees, especially those 
who earned lower wages.110  The Agency was also concerned that 
many employees held to noncompete agreements were laid off for 
economic reasons, rather than being fired or quitting voluntarily.111  
BOLI contended that it was unfair to hold employees to a noncompete 
 
104 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit L, at 1–3 (written testimony of Dan Gardner, 
Comm’r, Bureau of Labor and Industries). 
105 Brent Hunsberger, You Can’t Take That Job, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Apr. 29, 
2007; see also Nigel Jaquiss, Unreleased Rage: Before Leaving to Work for the 
Competition, Better Make Sure You Can, WILLAMETTE WK. (Portland, Or.), May 23, 
2007, available at http://www.wweek.com/editorial/3328/9004. 
106 Hunsberger, supra note 105. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109 Id. 
110 Id.; see also Jaquiss, supra note 105. 
111 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit L, at 1–2 (written testimony of Dan Gardner, 
Comm’r, Bureau of Labor and Industries). 
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agreement if the former employer simply could not afford to keep 
them on the payroll.112  For these reasons, BOLI Commissioner Dan 
Gardner filed Senate Bill 248 prior to the start of the 2007 Oregon 
legislative session.113  Section 2 of Senate Bill 248 contained the 
amendments to ORS 653.295.114 
A.  The Legislative History of Senate Bill 248 
Senate Bill 248 went through a complete transformation from its 
first draft to the final version signed by the governor.115  In its 
original form, section 2 of Senate Bill 248 contained only two modest 
amendments to ORS 653.295.116  The first draft required that a 
noncompete agreement be signed prior to the start of employment, 
rather than at the start of employment, and the bill voided a 
noncompete agreement if an employee was laid off for reasons other 
than “misconduct connected with work.”117  The bill stated that a 
noncompete agreement would be voidable 
(a)(A) [u]nless the employer informs the employee at the time the 
offer of employment is first communicated to the employee that a 
noncompetition agreement is required as a condition of 
employment; . . . 
(B) [u]nless the noncompetition agreement is entered into upon a 
subsequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the 
employer[; or] 
(b) [i]f the employee is discharged or laid off by the employer for a 
reason other than misconduct connected with work. As used in this 
paragraph, “misconduct connected with work” has the meaning 
applied to that term under ORS 657.176.118 
The Oregon Senate Judiciary Committee amended the bill to 
provide some exceptions to the layoff language.119  Employees 
exempt from the layoff provision included the following: (1) chief 
executive officers, chief financial officers, or members of the board of 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1–3. 
114 S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), available at 
http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measures/sb0200.dir/sb0248.intro.html. 
115 See Or. State Legislature, supra note 1. 




119 A-Engrossed S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
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directors of the company; (2) employees who were rehired within 
ninety days of the layoff; and (3) employees that were entitled to 
receive full salary during the term of the noncompete agreement.120  
Also, the subsection related to layoffs did not apply to covenants not 
to solicit or transact business with customers of the former 
employers.121  In other words, the layoff subsection did not apply to 
nonsolicitation agreements.  Basically, if an employee was laid off, 
that employee was held to a nonsolicitation agreement but not a 
general noncompete agreement. 
Why was this nonsolicitation agreement exception included in the 
subsection regarding layoffs?  Likely because the employees for 
whom the layoff provision was written to protect, including low-wage 
workers such as parking attendants or copy center employees, were 
not the type of employees who normally would solicit customers from 
a former employer.  However, they were the type of employees who 
would likely need to work for a competitor in a similar position 
within a close geographic area.  An exception for nonsolicitation 
agreements within the layoff restrictions is a more understandable and 
appropriate place to exempt these agreements, as opposed to the 
exemption from all the statutory regulations established by the current 
statute. 
The Senate passed this version of the bill, and the proposal moved 
on to the House of Representatives.122  During the first public hearing 
of the Oregon House Judiciary Committee, Labor Commissioner 
Gardner testified that the version of the bill that passed the Senate was 
a work in progress and that more work needed to be done to protect 
employees from unjust noncompete agreements.123  The 
Commissioner was concerned that proposals to amend the bill were 
not going far enough toward meeting the “goal of protecting a large 
swath of Oregon workers from the reach of non-competition 
agreements.”124 
Throughout two work sessions, the Oregon House Judiciary 




122 See Or. State Legislature, supra note 1. 
123 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit L, at 1–3 (written testimony of Dan Gardner, 
Comm’r, Bureau of Labor and Industries). 
124 Id. at 1. 
125 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SENATE BILL 248 SUMMARY, 74th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
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The version of the bill that passed the Senate focused on voiding 
noncompete agreements when employees were laid off for reasons 
other than just cause.126  The amendments drafted by the House 
focused on the type of employee that could be held to a noncompete 
agreement.127  The new version stated that a noncompete agreement 
was voidable and may not be enforced by an Oregon court unless an 
employee was the person who “(a) [p]erforms predominately 
intellectual, managerial or creative tasks; (b) [e]xercises discretion 
and independent judgment; and (c) [e]arns a salary and is paid on a 
salary basis.”128 
The new version of the bill also explicitly stated that noncompete 
agreements would be enforceable against both employees who have 
access to trade secrets, “competitively sensitive confidential 
business,” or “professional information that otherwise would not 
qualify as a trade secret,” and employees who are on-air talents in the 
field of broadcasting.129  Finally, the bill contained the following new 
temporal requirements: the agreement must be signed two weeks prior 
to the start of employment, rather than merely “prior” to employment, 
and it may only extend for a period of two years.130 
The new version of the bill limited the enforceability of 
noncompete agreements to certain types of employees.131  This was a 
significant shift from the previous bill language, which focused 
primarily on the layoff provision.  The new bill was also more 
restrictive and specific, particularly with regard to the temporal 
restrictions.  Significantly, the first amended version of the bill also 
did not contain any language exempting nonsolicitation agreements 
from any parts of the bill.132 
However, BOLI was not the only group lobbying for specific 
changes to the bill.  The Professional Insurance Agents of 
Oregon/Idaho group had a large stake in the legislation and a strong 
 
126 House Amendments to A-Engrossed S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. 1–3 (Or. 
2007). 
127 Id. at 1–2. 
128 Id. at 1.  The employee must be a person described in ORS 653.020(3). 
129 Id. at 2. 
130 Id. at 1–2. 
131 See id. at 1–3. 
132 Id. 
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presence in front of the House Judiciary Committee.133  The lobbying 
group testified before the committee that the bill in its current form 
did not go far enough to protect employers, like insurance agents, 
from losing their customer lists and other confidential information.134  
They requested that the bill contain language exempting 
nonsolicitation agreements from the new restrictions on noncompete 
agreements.135  In testimony before the committee, lobbyist Lana 
Butterfield expressed that independent insurance agents rely heavily 
on customer lists to maintain their businesses and insurance agencies 
require that the agents have solid customer lists in order to renew their 
contracts.136  She explained that if customer lists and relationships are 
not adequately protected, then insurance agents may suffer a decrease 
in the value of their agencies.137  She argued that a nonsolicitation 
exemption to the noncompete agreement restrictions would 
adequately protect these insurance agents.138 
While the insurance agents were concerned about customer lists 
and relationships, employment attorneys were concerned that the bill 
did not go far enough to prevent former employees from soliciting a 
former employer’s current employees.139  They recommended that the 
committee amend the bill to include an exemption for covenants not 
to solicit employees, as well as customers, of the former employer.140 
The House Judiciary Committee included both of these exemptions 
in the bill.141  Once approved by the committee, the bill went on to 
 
133 See Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit I, at 1 (written testimony of Lana Butterfield, 
Oregon Lobbyist, Professional Insurance Agents of Oregon/Idaho); Letter from Randy 
Sutton, supra note 9. 
134 Letter from Randy Sutton, supra note 9. 
135 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit I, at 1 (written testimony of Lana Butterfield, Oregon 
Lobbyist, Professional Insurance Agents of Oregon/Idaho). 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  (“For agency owners who have sunk their savings into building up an 
independent insurance agency, the renewal book of business becomes their retirement.  If 
customer lists and customer relationships of an agency are not adequately protected, this 
may impact the value of an agency and thus the retirement prospects of the agency 
owner.”). 
138 Id. 
139 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit M, at 2–3 (written testimony of Craig Smith & 
Andrew Lewis, Attorneys, Hershner Hunter LLP).  Smith and Lewis suggested that 
“[b]ecause the courts have recognized that employers have a protectible interest in their 
customers and employees, the legislature’s distinction between those two valuable 
employer assets cannot be justified.”  Id. at 2. 
140 Id. 
141 B-Engrossed S. 248, § 2, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
 538 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 515 
the House floor for a vote.142  The debate about the bill on the House 
floor focused primarily on the burden created for employers, and 
potentially employees, by the “two week prior to employment” 
requirement.143  The bill passed, but narrowly, with thirty-two ayes 
and twenty-seven nays; it was primarily a vote along party lines.144 
Since the bill had been completely altered by the House, it was 
necessary to send the bill back to the Senate for another vote of 
approval before passing it to the governor’s desk.145  Because the bill 
did not really resemble the original Senate version at all, the House 
and Senate formed a conference committee to discuss the new 
language of the bill and make any further changes.  The conference 
committee made minor amendments.146  Both the House and Senate 
repassed the bill with the amendments made in the conference 
committee.147  The bill was ultimately signed into law by Governor 
Kulongoski on August 6, 2007, and took effect on January 1, 2008.148 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS: INCONSISTENT REGULATIONS ON RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 
The amendments to ORS 653.295 are relatively new, so we have 
not yet seen case law asking the courts to clarify any of the language 
in the statute.  The purpose of the bill was to limit the use of 
noncompete agreements by employers.149  The highly restrictive 
language in subsections (1) and (2) of the statute may deter employers 
 




145 Or. State Legislature, supra note 1. 
146 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, CONFERENCE COMMITTEE MEASURE 
SUMMARY, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
147 Floor Record, S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. June 27, 2007) (House 
Audio Tape) (voting mostly along party lines—thirty-four ayes to twenty-six nays); Floor 
Record, S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. June 26, 2007) (Senate Audio Tape) 
(voting eighteen ayes to ten nays).  The debate on the House floor focused on the burdens 
Senate Bill 248 might have on employers and employees who want to start a job right 
away but may need to wait two weeks to begin after signing a noncompete agreement.  See 
Floor Debate, S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. June 22, 2007) (House Audio 
Tape). 
148 Or. State Legislature, supra note 1. 
149 Hearing, supra note 4, Exhibit L, at 1 (written testimony of Dan Gardner, Comm’r, 
Bureau of Labor and Industries). 
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from using noncompete agreements.  But the overly specific, 
micromanaging language in subsections (1) and (2) is perhaps 
unnecessary to effectuate the purposes of the original bill.  This 
language could be simplified to be less confusing to employers, 
employees, and courts.  Further, the nonsolicitation exemption in 
subsection (4) significantly changes Oregon law and opens the door 
for employers to have unrestricted use of those covenants.  Much of 
what the statute is trying to accomplish in subsections (1) and (2) 
could be effectively undone by section (4). 
A.  Subsections (1) and (2): Overly Detailed, but Not Well Defined 
Subsections (1) and (2) of the statute detail the manner in which a 
noncompete agreement may be entered into and the type of employee 
against whom a noncompete agreement may be enforced.150  As 
previously mentioned, Oregon’s statute is unique because it sets very 
specific parameters for the use of noncompete agreements by 
employers.  However, there are many terms within the law that are 
not well defined and likely will lead to more, not less, litigation.  
Given the history of case law in Oregon, such disputes over specific 
terms in the statute will likely arise when questions of enforceability 
pertaining to higher-paid workers come before a court.  Because so 
many disputes arose out of terms like “initial employment” and “bona 
fide advancement” in the past, parties are likely to hassle over many 
of the new specifications.151 
For example, disputes will likely arise over the terms that define 
professional employees who are still subject to noncompete 
agreements.  Courts will be faced with fact-based questions of what 
constitutes “predominantly intellectual, managerial or creative tasks” 
or “exercises discretion and independent judgment.”152  Does 
“predominantly” refer to the time the employee spends on intellectual, 
managerial, or creative tasks, or does “predominantly” refer to the 
most important tasks or roles of the employee?  Does the employee 
have to exercise discretion and independent judgment all the time or 
 
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1), (2) (2009). 
151 See Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576 (9th Cir. 2004); Konecranes, Inc. v. Scott 
Sinclair, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (D. Or. 2004); McGee v. Coe Mfg. Co., 203 Or. App. 10, 
125 P.3d 26 (2005); Pac. Veterinary Hosp. v. White, 72 Or. App. 533, 696 P.2d 570 
(1985). 
152 § 653.295(1)(b).  The language referred to in this statute to describe the type of 
employee that can be held to a noncompete agreement is the same language used in ORS 
653.020(3) to describe professional employees who are exempt from overtime benefits. 
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just with certain tasks?  If the employee reports to a supervisor, does 
that mean the employee does not exercise discretion? 
Similarly, although the term “trade secrets” is fairly easy to define 
through the cross-referenced statute, ORS 646.461, a more ambiguous 
phrase is “competitively sensitive confidential business or 
professional information that otherwise would not qualify as a trade 
secret.”153  “Competitively sensitive confidential” information could 
be broadly interpreted by employers and by courts.  For example, this 
phrase could be used to describe a specific sales technique or 
marketing strategy that the employer uses.  Does this strategy have to 
be written down to be protectable?  Does the employee need to have 
notice that the strategy is “competitively sensitive?”  It also seems 
that this category could encompass the commercial lists the insurance 
agents were so concerned about protecting.  The category seems 
broad enough to encompass confidential customer lists, among other 
things. 
Employers will certainly need to adjust their noncompete 
agreements to comply with these restrictions.  Law firms are posting 
open letters to their clients instructing them on the specific changes 
they will need to make to comply with the law.154  Similarly, 
employees will need to ensure that any noncompete agreement they 
sign complies with the restrictions before signing.  The statutory 
restrictions likely have, or will have, the effect of forcing employers 
to err on the side of caution with regard to noncompete agreements.  
If the general understanding of the law is that noncompete agreements 
are usually unenforceable, employers will likely limit their use of 
them.  However, the statute could use much simpler and less 
confusing language to accomplish this goal.  The recommendations 
below in Part V of this Comment give an example of alternative 
language. 
Another criticism of the recently enacted statutory restrictions on 
noncompete agreements comes from business advocates.155  Many 
believe that the restrictions will deter businesses from setting up in 
Oregon because the noncompete laws are so restrictive.156  However, 
this concern can be dispelled by looking at states where noncompete 
agreements are prohibited outright, particularly California.  California 
 
153 § 653.295(1)(c)(B). 
154 See sources cited supra note 16. 
155 See DuBoff & King, supra note 17. 
156 Id. 
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houses the most high-tech businesses in the country, even though 
high-tech companies are generally the most concerned with protecting 
trade secrets.157  Although California prohibits noncompete 
agreements, and now even further limits restrictive covenants after the 
Arthur Anderson decision, the state continues to attract big 
businesses.  Further, Oregon’s largest employer, Intel, does not even 
use noncompete agreements.158 
B.  Subsection (4): A Dangerous Loophole 
Despite the hand-wringing from the business community and 
employer advocates, the most significant problem with the statute is 
the nonsolicitation exemption.  The nonsolicitation exemption not 
only provides employers with noteworthy protections from unwanted 
competition; it also removes previous restrictions on nonsolicitation 
agreements that existed under the old statute.  The significance of this 
exemption has caught the attention of only a handful of legal analysts.  
As one attorney writes, “Although it’s more difficult under the new 
law to prohibit many employees from working for competitors, an 
employer still has many options for seeking relief against employees 
who leave and set up a competitive business.”159  Another attorney 
points out the nonsolicitation exemption and suggests that “[p]erhaps 
unintentionally, the Legislature also left off the former requirement 
that such nonsolicitation agreements must be entered when an 
employee starts work or receives a meaningful promotion.  This 
might mean employers will be free to impose nonsolicitation 
agreements at any time.”160 
The effect of exempting nonsolicitation agreements from all the 
provisions in the statute is that these agreements have no restrictions, 
including limits on when an employer may require an employee to 
sign one, how long an employer may enforce a nonsolicitation 
agreement, and the geographic range within which the employee may 
not solicit customers.  Potentially, an employer could require an 
 
157 Arnow-Richman, supra note 73, at 1190. 
158 Hunsberger, supra note 105. 
159 Richard Hunt, Commentary: New Non-Compete Rules Not Entirely Problematic, 
DAILY J. COM., Dec. 18, 2007, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/company              
-activities-management/sales-selling-sales/8888905-1.html. 
160 Jeffrey M. Edelson, Misguided New Law Muddles Noncompete Agreements, 
PORTLAND BUS. J., Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/ 
stories/2007/08/27/editorial12.html.  Edelson is an attorney with Markowitz, Herbold, 
Glade, and Mehlhaf PC. 
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employee to sign a nonsolicitation agreement at any point in time, that 
lasts for however long, and restricts the employee from any 
solicitation of customers and employees within however many miles. 
The Oregonians most vulnerable to this significant change in the 
law are those employees who plan to start their own businesses within 
a trade they practice for their employers.  For example, a hair stylist 
who works for a corporate salon may be required to sign a 
nonsolicitation agreement at any time during her employment.  If this 
employee has signed a nonsolicitation agreement, she will not be able 
to open her own business and let her clients know about her new 
operation.  This is a burden not only on the stylist, but also on the 
general public.  It limits the available choices for customers.  A 
nonsolicitation agreement does not prevent customers from seeking 
out that former employee’s new business, but many customers may 
not be aware that the former employee has left to start up the 
business. 
The exemption of nonsolicitation agreements from all statutory 
restrictions was perhaps unintentional.  Recall that in the original 
Senate version of the bill there was an exemption for nonsolicitation 
agreements only within the subsection regarding layoffs.161  Later, in 
the House version of the bill, the exemption was changed to apply to 
all of subsections (1) and (2), which contain all the restrictions on 
noncompete agreements.162  Given the hasty nature of the Oregon 
legislature’s short, every-other-year sessions, it is likely that the bill 
was pushed through quickly toward the end without full 
contemplation of the implications of the bill language.  Perhaps the 
legislators knew what they were doing, although there is no record 
showing that they contemplated the implications of a total exemption 
of nonsolicitation agreements.  It is unlikely that the legislators 
intended to take such an extreme approach with this legislation.  
Nonsolicitation agreements are so inherently similar to noncompete 
agreements that to completely remove all restrictions on one while 
significantly restricting another defies legal and legislative logic. 
 
161 A-Engrossed S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
162 B-Engrossed S. 248, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
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V 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The legislature should amend ORS 653.295 to eliminate some of 
the unnecessary, micromanaging language in subsections (1) and (2) 
and the nonsolicitation agreement exemption in subsection (4).  The 
statute can still accomplish the goals of BOLI—limiting the use of 
noncompete agreements by employers—while carving out some 
protection for the insurance agents.  But the language on both ends of 
the spectrum does not need to be so severe. 
Taking cues from some other states’ statutes, and taking into 
consideration some of the problems that could result from the current 
version of ORS 653.295, the Oregon legislature could draft language 
similar to the following: 
(1) Every restrictive covenant entered into between an employer 
and employee that restrains the employee from exercising a 
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is voidable 
unless: 
(a) The employee: 
(1) is bona fide executive or management personnel; 
(2) earns a salary; 
(3) has access to trade secrets or other commercially 
sensitive information; and 
(b) The employer is explicitly protecting a legitimate business 
interest, which may include: 
(1) trade secrets; or 
(2) certain confidential customer lists. 
(2)  Any enforceable restrictive covenant described in section (1) 
must: 
(a) be entered into two weeks prior to initial employment or 
upon a bona fide advancement; and 
(b) not exceed a period of two years after the end of the 
employment relationship. 
In fewer words, this language accomplishes much of what BOLI 
intended while providing some protection for insurance agents.  
Notice in the proposed subsection (1), the subject of the statute is any 
“restrictive covenant . . . that restrains the employee from exercising a 
lawful profession” rather than “noncompetition agreement.”  This 
recommended language is clearer as to what types of contracts the 
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statute applies, whereas “noncompetition agreement” is more 
ambiguous because it depends on court interpretation. 
Proposed subsection 1(a) describes the type of employee against 
whom an employer may enforce a restrictive covenant.  Rather than 
bogging down the statute with a myriad of descriptive terms and 
cross-references to other statutes, this language focuses on the 
important aspects of the employee.  A phrase like “bona fide 
executive or management personnel” can encompass all the terms in 
the current version of ORS 653.295 without using ambiguous phrases 
such as “predominately performs.” 
Proposed subsection 1(b) provides some protection for employers 
who might have a legitimate business reason to protect customer lists, 
such as the insurance agents.  This subsection allows an employer to 
use a restrictive covenant to protect legitimate business interests as 
long as the employee is one described in proposed subsection 1(a).  
By allowing an employer to protect aspects of the business that it 
deems confidential, the statute has protected that employer without 
creating a loophole that undercuts the other provisions of the statute.  
Also, this protection only occurs within one provision of the statute 
and is still subject to the other restrictions in the statute.  The current 
version of ORS 653.295 exempts nonsolicitation agreements from all 
the other terms of the statute, including the minimum temporal and 
employee requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 248, it did so with 
the goal of protecting Oregon employees from the unjust use of 
noncompete agreements by employers.  Most of the language in the 
amended version of ORS 653.295 serves to limit employers’ use of 
noncompete agreements.  In fact, this language is perhaps excessively 
stringent and detailed as to the manner in which noncompete 
agreements may be carried out.  However, the exemption for 
nonsolicitation agreements that applies to all the restrictions in the 
statute serves to undercut much of the law’s force.  Most importantly, 
the exemption for nonsolicitation agreements undercuts the legislative 
intent for Senate Bill 248.  It appears the legislature was trying to 
carve out some protection for Oregon insurance agents by inserting 
the exemption.  But it does not appear from the legislative history that 
the legislature contemplated the gravity and full implications of a 
blanket exemption for nonsolicitation agreements. 
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The resulting Oregon law—severe and detailed in its restrictions 
for noncompete agreements but void of all restrictions for 
nonsolicitation agreements—places Oregon in its own category 
amongst states with regard to laws dealing with restrictive covenants 
in employment relationships.  The Oregon law is not consistent with 
national trends governing this area of law.  Most states generally 
restrict or generally allow all restrictive covenants.163  Likewise, 
courts tend to hold that noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation 
agreements are subject to the same restrictions.164  State and federal 
court interpretations of Oregon’s restrictive covenant law have held 
that noncompete agreements and nonsolicitation agreements are 
subject to the same restrictions.165 
Perhaps the legislature was intending to make the Oregon law 
unique, but, more likely, this was a drafting oversight.  Instead of 
providing protection for the insurance agents from parts of the 
statutory restrictions, the legislature exempted nonsolicitation 
agreements from all of the restrictions. 
The legislature should go back to the drawing board and draft a 
new statute governing restrictive covenants in employment 
relationships.  The language in the current law is confusing and 
frustrating for employers and employees because of the inflexible and 
overly wordy restrictions in subsections (1) and (2).  At the same 
time, the nonsolicitation agreement exemption in subsection (4) 
threatens to undercut much of the employee protections set out in the 
first part of the statute and the protections provided to employees in 
past Oregon judicial decisions.  If the legislature cannot go as far as 
California and just ban these restrictive covenants outright, it needs to 
at least simplify and clarify the statutory language.  As it stands, ORS 
653.295 contains too much fine print. 
 
163 See statutes cited supra note 13. 
164 See First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Sumner, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238–39 (D. 
Or. 2002); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 233 F. Supp. 2d 789, 794 (W.D. Va. 
2002); Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292–93 (Cal. 2008); Dymock v. 
Norwest Safety Protective Equip. for Or. Indus., Inc., 334 Or. 55, 58–59, 45 P.3d 114, 115 
(2002). 
165 See First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–39; Dymock, 334 Or. 
at 58–59, 45 P.3d at 115. 
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